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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
Nos. 10-1185 & 10-1684 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALFREDERICK JONES, 
a/k/a Frederick Jones 
 
       Alfrederick Jones, 
        Appellant 
 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-09-cr-00137-001) 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-09-cr-00269-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 14, 2011) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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 Alfrederick Jones was convicted in the District Court of two counts of distribution 
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Jones requests that we vacate the 
judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
1
  We disagree, and thus affirm. 
I. Background 
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  Jones was indicted for two alleged sales of cocaine to a cooperating 
government witness, James Hawkins, in an undercover investigation.  Both undercover 
operations were controlled by surveillance officers.  The first operation was audio-
recorded and videotaped.  Because of an equipment malfunction, only the videotape of 
the second operation was available at trial, although the officers heard a live audio 
transmission during the operation.  During the week-long trial, the two videotapes and a 
videotape of the officers‟ observation of Jones prior to Hawkins‟s first alleged purchase 
were played to the jury.  It was provided a transcript of the audio recording of the first 
operation.  Hawkins and the officers testified regarding the operations.      
Two incidents during the trial are at issue in this appeal.  First, during his opening 
statement, the prosecutor noted:  “There‟s been a stipulation. . . .  [W]e‟ve agreed that 
there‟s been an analysis conducted by the Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Forensic 
Services . . . .  [T]hey analyzed Government‟s Exhibits 1 and 2, which [were] purchased 
from [Jones].”  Appendix (“App.”) 118.  After the prosecutor‟s opening, during a sidebar 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Jones filed a notice of appeal from the judgment in an unrelated case, 
which was docketed at No. 10-1684 and consolidated with the current appeal at No. 10-
1185.  Jones is not pursuing his appeal in No. 10-1684, and thus it is dismissed. 
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conference, Jones‟s counsel requested that the District Judge clarify that the stipulation 
provided that the drugs in the Government‟s Exhibits 1 and 2 contained cocaine, not that 
the drugs were purchased from Jones.  The Judge stated to the jury:   
I told you that during the course of the trial you may hear stipulations of 
counsel.  Well, you just heard one stipulation.  That stipulation is that the 
drugs that were -- that the agents presented to the lab were, in fact, cocaine.  
That‟s the stipulation.  That the drugs were analyzed and they were cocaine.   
App. 120.  Jones‟s counsel did not object to this clarification.  In any event, both before 
the prosecutor‟s opening and during its closing instructions, the Judge told the jury that 
counsels‟ statements and arguments were not evidence.  
 Second, during his cross-examination of Hawkins, Jones‟s counsel asked about the 
audio recording and videotape of the first operation:  “Now, when Mr. Jones first got to 
you, you spoke outside for a little while, correct?”  App. 245.  Hawkins responded:  
Right, [Jones] was kind of saying this was a place where he shot somebody 
at and that, that one of my cousins, you know, didn‟t tell him and so forth 
and so on or whatever, something to that extent, just pointing out the exact 
place where exactly -- where it exactly had happened at.   
Id.   
 Jones‟s counsel immediately asked for a sidebar conference because of Hawkins‟s 
allegedly prejudicial implication that Jones had committed another crime.  He initially 
requested a mistrial, which the District Court denied.  He then requested an instruction, 
but stated that he didn‟t know what that instruction should be.  The District Judge asked:  
“Well, do you agree that the tape does not reflect that Jones indicated that he shot 
somebody? . . .  I can certainly indicate that the tape does not say that Mr. Jones shot 
anyone.”  App. 246-47.  Jones‟s counsel suggested that would be a start, to which the 
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Judge replied:  “Unless you can give me some request, that‟s the way I intend to deal 
with it.”  Id. at 247.  He did not make a request.  The Judge confirmed:  “I will handle the 
situation as I just indicated, if you request that.”  Id.  Jones‟s counsel stated:  “I do.”  Id. 
 The District Judge then addressed the jury:  “I want to simply caution you at this 
junction that the tape you heard does not indicate that Mr. Jones said that he shot 
anyone.”  Id. at 247-48.  Jones‟s counsel did not object to this clarification.  In addition, 
during his closing instructions, the Judge focused the jury on the two charges against 
Jones:  “[T]he only charges in this case for your consideration are the charges of 
distribution of cocaine. . . .  [T]here is no charge with regard to firearms . . . .”  Id. at 621. 
On appeal, Jones argues that the District Court erred by (1) denying his request for 
a mistrial after the jury heard Hawkins‟s testimony about the alleged shooting, (2) not 
striking and directing the jury to disregard this testimony, and (3) not giving a proper 
curative instruction concerning the prosecutor‟s statement about the stipulation and 
directing the jury to disregard the prosecutor‟s statement.  
II. Analysis 
A. Mistrial Request 
We review a district court‟s denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a witness‟s 
allegedly prejudicial remarks for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 
312, 335-36 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  We analyze three factors to determine whether Jones was prejudiced: 
“(1) whether [the witness‟s] remarks were pronounced and persistent, creating a 
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likelihood they would mislead and prejudice the jury; (2) the strength of the other 
evidence; and (3) curative action taken by the district court.”  Lore, 430 F.3d at 207.     
Hawkins‟s single reference to a shooting during a rambling answer to one question 
during a lengthy cross-examination in the middle of a week-long trial is neither 
pronounced nor persistent.  The Government presented other evidence that the jury could 
have relied on to convict Jones.  The strength of this other evidence is sufficient to 
outweigh any possible prejudice Hawkins‟s remark may have caused Jones.  Finally, the 
District Court provided the jury with a curative instruction that highlighted that 
Hawkins‟s remark was not on the audio recording of the first undercover operation, 
which was the subject of the question that elicited the remark.  Moreover, at the 
conclusion of the trial, the Court specifically noted that there was no charge regarding 
firearms.  See Riley, 621 F.3d at 336-37; Lore, 430 F.3d at 207.  It did not err in denying 
Jones‟s motion for a mistrial.      
B. Curative Instruction Regarding Hawkins’s Testimony 
Because Jones‟s counsel did not object to the curative instruction regarding 
Hawkins‟s remark or request that the District Court take additional remedial steps, its 
instruction and failure to strike the remark are reviewed for plain error.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 
322.  To demonstrate plain error, Jones must establish that: “(1) there is an „error‟; (2) the 
error is „clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute‟; [and] (3) the error 
„affected the appellant‟s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means‟ it „affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings.‟”  Id. (quoting United States v. Marcus, -- 
U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)).  If Jones establishes all three elements, we may 
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exercise our discretion to award relief if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).   
The District Court‟s alleged errors are not clear or obvious and did not affect the 
outcome of the proceedings.  It provided the jury with a curative instruction that 
recognized that Hawkins‟s first meeting with Jones was audio-recorded and that Jones‟s 
counsel was asking Hawkins about that meeting.  The Court later reminded the jury that 
there was no charge regarding firearms.  There also was substantial other evidence that 
the jury could have relied on to convict Jones.  Thus, there was no plain error in not 
striking or directing the jury to disregard Hawkins‟s remark. 
C. Curative Instruction Regarding The Stipulation 
Because Jones‟s counsel did not object to the District Court‟s curative instruction 
regarding the prosecutor‟s statement about the stipulation, its instruction and failure to 
direct the jury to disregard the statement also are reviewed for plain error.  As with 
Hawkins‟s remark, the alleged errors are not clear or obvious and did not affect the 
outcome of the proceedings.  The Court‟s instruction clarified that the stipulation only 
provided that the drugs had been analyzed and found to contain cocaine, which addressed 
how the jury may have misconstrued the prosecutor‟s statement.  In addition, the 
prosecutor‟s statement occurred very shortly after the Court instructed the jury that 
counsels‟ opening statements were not evidence.  After this clarification, Jones‟s counsel 
proceeded with his opening statement, during which he argued that Jones had not 
engaged in any drug transactions.  By the end of his opening, the jury understood that 
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there was no stipulation that Jones had sold the drugs in the Government‟s exhibits.  
Moreover, in its closing instructions, the Court repeated that counsels‟ statements were 
not evidence.  There also was substantial evidence the jury could have relied on to 
convict Jones.  Again, there was no plain error in instructing the jury concerning the 
prosecutor‟s statement about the stipulation or in not directing the jury to disregard the 
statement.  
*    *    *    *    * 
For these reasons, we affirm.  
